# Smart distributed Cyber Infrastructure for Secure Big Data Sharing and Processing. Cees de Laat







# Science Faculty @ UvA

### **Informatics Institute**



- AMLAB: Machine Learning (Prof. dr. M. Welling)
- CV: Computer Vision (Prof. dr. Theo Gevers)
- CSL: Computational Science Laboratory (Prof. dr. P.M.A. Sloot)
- FCN: Federated Collaborative Networks (Prof. dr. H. Afsarmanesh)
- ILPS: Information and Language Processing Systems (Prof. dr. M. de Rijke)
- ISIS: Intelligent Sensory Information Systems (Prof. dr. ir. A.W.M. Smeulders)
- SNE: System and Network Engineering (Prof. dr. ir. C.T.A.M. de Laat)
- TCS: Theory of Computer Science (Prof. dr. J.A. Bergstra)



# **SNE** - Mission

# Can we create smart and safe data processing infrastructures that can be tailored to diverse application needs?

- Capacity
  - Bandwidth on demand, QoS, architectures, photonics, performance
- Capability
  - Programmability, virtualization, complexity, semantics, workflows
- Security
  - Policy, Trust, Anonymity, Privacy, Integrity
- Sustainability
  - Greening infrastructure, Awareness
- Resilience
  - Failures, Disasters, Systems under attack




# SNE - Staffing

Group leader: prof. C. de Laat

Deputy group leaders: dr. Andy Pimentel, dr. Paola Grosso

- 1 full prof (CdL)
- 2 part time professors
- 3 endowed professors
- 2 senior researchers
- 1 associate prof
- 4 assistant professors
- ~12 postdoc's
- About 15 phd students
- ~10 guests

When top level guys look down they see only shit.



When bottom level guys look up they see only assholes.

# **SNE** - Mission


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# What Happens in an Internet Minute?





#### 

# There always bigger fish

# Reliable and Safe!


This omnipresence of IT makes us not only strong but also vulnerable.

A virus, a hacker, or a system failure can instantly send digital

shockwaves around the world.

The hardware and software that allow all our systems to operate is becoming bigger and more complex all the time, and the capacity of networks and data storage is increasing by leaps and bounds.





We will soon reach the limits of what is currently feasible and controllable.




## The GLIF – LightPaths around the World

F Dijkstra, J van der Ham, P Grosso, C de Laat, "A path finding implementation for multi-layer networks", Future Generation Computer Systems 25 (2), 142-146.




### Amsterdam is a major hub in The GLIF

F Dijkstra, J van der Ham, P Grosso, C de Laat, "A path finding implementation for multi-layer networks", Future Generation Computer Systems 25 (2), 142-146.



# ExoGeni @ OpenLab - UvA

### Installed and up June 3th 2013



### TNC2013 DEMOS JUNE, 2013

DEMO	TITLE	OWNER	AFFILIATIO	N E-MAIL	A-SIDE	Z-SIDE	PORTS(S) MAN LAN	PORTS(S) TNC2013	DETAILS
•	Big data transfers with multipathing, OpenFlow and MPTCP	Ronald van der Pol	SURFnet	ronald.vanderpol@surfnet.nl	TNC/MECC, Maastricht NL	Chicago, IL	Existing 100G link between internet2 and ESnet	2x40GE (luniper)+ 2x10GE (OME6500)	In this demonstration we show how multipathing, Openiflow and Multipath TCP (MPTCP) can help in large file transfers between date centres (Musattoria and Chicago). An Openiflow application provisions multiple paths between the servines and UPTCP will but and on the servines to instructionary send multiple paths between the servines and UPTCP will but and on the servines to instructionary send account of the path of the servines are servines and the servines of the servines of the servines of the servines and 2.0400 between MMILLAN and Statelyk AC and USI (100-per provide additional 2015).
2	Visualize 100G traffic	Inder Monga	ESnet	imonga@es.net					Using an SNMP feed from the Juniper switch at TNC2013,and/or Brocade AL25 node in MANLAN, this demo would visualize the total traffic on the link, of all demos aggregated. The network diagram will show the transatlantic topology and some of the demo topologies.
3	How many modern servers can fill a 100Gbps Transatlantic Circuit?	Inder Monga	ESnet	imonga@es.net	Chicago, III	TNC showfloor	1x 100GE	8x 10GE	In this demonstration, we show that with the proper tuning and tool, only 2 hosts on each continent can generate almost 800gps of mathic. Each server has 4 NO NOS connected to a 400 virtual cross, and has period manning on generate traffic. Each is now "port?" immigrable measurement out, all in beta; combines the best features from other tools such as iperf, nutzicp, and neigherf. Sere https://my.es.net/demos/tro2015/
*	First European ExoGENI at Work	Jeroen van der Ham	UvA	vdham@uva.nl	RENCI, NC	UvA, Amsterdam, NL	1x 10GE	1x 10GE	The ExoGEN racks at RENCI and UniA will be interconnected over a 190 pipe and be on continuously, showing GENI connectivity between Anisterdam and the rest of the GENI nodes in the USA.
5	Up and down North Atlantic @ 100G	Michael Enrico	DANTE	michael.enrico@dante.net	TNC showfloor	TNC showfloor	1x 100GE	1x 100GE	The DANTE 1900E test set will be placed at the TNC2013 showfloor and connected to the Juniper at 1900. When this demo is running a loop (if MAN LAY's Broades which will ensure that the traffic sent to MAN LAY relations to the showfloor. On display is the throughput and RTT (to show the traffic traveled the Atlantic twice).



Connected via the new 100 Gb/s transatlantic To US-GENI



# Alien light From idea to realisation!



# 40Gb/s alien wavelength transmission via a multi-vendor 10Gb/s DWDM infrastructure



### Alien wavelength advantages

- Direct connection of customer equipment<sup>[1]</sup>
- Avoid OEO regeneration → power savings
- Faster time to service<sup>[2]</sup> → time savings
- Support of different modulation formats<sup>[3]</sup>
- → extend network lifetime


#### Alien wavelength challenges

- Complex end-to-end optical path engineering in terms of linear (i.e. OSNR, dispersion) and non-linear (FWM, SPM, XPM, Raman) transmission effects for different modulation formats.
- Complex interoperability testing.
- End-to-end monitoring, fault isolation and resolution.
- End-to-end service activation.

In this demonstration we will investigate the performance of a 40Gb/s PM-QPSK alien wavelength installed on a 10Gb/s DWDM infrastructure.


### New method to present fiber link quality, FoM (Figure of Merit)

In order to quantify optical link grade, we propose a new method of representing system quality: the FOM (Figure of Merit) for concatenated fiber spans.



### **Transmission system setup**

JOINT SURFnet/NORDUnet 40Gb/s PM-QPSK alien wavelength DEMONSTRATION.



#### Test results



Frror-free transmission for 23 hours 17 minutes → BER < 3.0.10-16

#### Conclusions

- We have investigated experimentally the all-optical transmission of a 40Gb/s PM-QPSK alien wavelength via a concatenated native and third party DWDM system that both were carrying live 10Gb/s wavelengths.
- The end-to-end transmission system consisted of 1056 km of TWRS (TrueWave Reduced Slope) transmission fiber
- We demonstrated error-free transmission (i.e. BER below 10-15) during a 23 hour period.
- More detailed system performance analysis will be presented in an upcoming paper.










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
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
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REFERENCES

[3] "OPEX SAVINGES OF ALL-OPTICAL ORGEN ETWORKS," CEREINE LET AL, OF CAUSE 11, [2] "A LEG OVER) (FILE ALL REMOVERS, SERVICES," SARBARKAR & LONGOUND LONGOUND AND CARL ENSINEER, EACCOME [14] (NOTE ELECTION FILE THE SERVICES," SARBARKAR & LONGOUND L

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# SARNET: Security Autonomous Response with programmable NETworks

Cees de Laat Leon Gommans, Rodney Wilson, Rob Meijer Tom van Engers, Marc Lyonais, Paola Grosso, Frans Franken, Ameneh Deljoo, Ralph Koning, Ben de Graaff, Stojan Trajanovski





University of Amsterdam











# Cyber security program

Research goal is to obtain the knowledge to create ICT systems that:

Adapt

Security

Observe


Observe

- model their state (situation)
- discover by observations and reasoning if and how an attack is developing and calculate the associated risks
- have the knowledge to calculate the effect of counter measures on states and their risks
- choose and execute one.

In short, we research the concept of networked computer infrastructures exhibiting SAR: Security Autonomous Response.

### Context & Goal

### **Security Autonomous Response NETwork Research**



### Ameneh Deljoo (PhD):

Why create SARNET Alliances?
Model autonomous SARNET
behaviors to identify risk and benefits
for SARNET stakeholders


### Stojan Trajanovski (PD):

Determine best defense scenario against cyberattacks deploying SARNET functions (1) based on security state and KPI information (2).

### Ralph Koning (PhD) Ben de Graaff (SP):

 Design functionalities needed to operate a SARNET using SDN/NFV
 deliver security state and KPI information (e.g cost)


### Ciena's CENI topology





### CENI, International extension to University of Amsterdam

Research Triangle Project. Operation Spring of 2015



National Science Foundations ExoGENI racks, installed at UvA (Amsterdam), Northwestern University (Chicago) and Ciena's labs (Ottawa), are connected via a high performance 100G research network and trans-Atlantic network facilities using the Ciena 8700 Packetwave platform. This equipment configuration is used to create a computational and storage test bed used in collaborative demonstrations.



### Position of demo @ SC15

### **Objective**

- To get a better understanding for cyber attack complexity by visually defend a network suffering from basic volumetric attacks.
- To find a way to visualize future research in automated response.


### **Demo highlights**

- Pre-programmed attack scenarios that are able to show defense functions.
- Virtual sales + income from web services
- Defense cost


### **DDoS Defence functions.**

- Filtering
- Blocking
- Resource Scaling

### Demo



# Basic operating system loop





# Service Provider Group framework

A Service Provider Group (SPG) is an organisation structure providing a defined service only available if its members collaborate.


Examples:












### **Envisioned role of the SPG: define slice archetypes?**




### **Agent Based Modelling Framework**

	Main component
Signal layer	Message / Act
Action layer	Action / Activity
Intentional layer	Intention
Motivational layer	Motive


In our model, we refer to four layers of components:

- ➤ the signal layer— describes acts, side-effects and failures showing outcomes of actions in a topology.
- the action layer—actions: performances that bring a certain result,
- ➤ the intentional layer—intentions: commitments to actions, or to build up intentions,
- ➤ the motivational layer—motives: events triggering the creation of intentions.

# Simplified Eduroam case at signalling layer



# Describing Intentions, Motivations and Actions




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
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# The Big Data Challenge



# The Big Data Challenge



curation - description - trust - security - policy – integrity





**OWL** 

### Data

a.o. from ESFRI's



XML, RDF, rSpec, SNMP, Java based, etc.














# TimeLine



1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2005 2007 2010 2015

# Questions?

http://delaat.net

http://delaat.net/sarnet

Leon Gommans, "Multi-Domain Authorization for e-Infrastructures", UvA, Dec 2014.

http://delaat.net/pubs/2014-t-3.pdf

Rudolf Strijkers, "Internet Factories", UvA, Nov 2014.

http://delaat.net/pubs/2014-t-2.pdf

### Contact us:

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