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Proof of Proposition 3.4

Proposition 3.4.
In a game Gamma, common knowledge of Bayesian rationality is satisfied if, and only if, (3.i) is common knowledge.

Proof.
Suppose first that common knowledge of Bayesian rationality is satisfied. Since it is common knowledge that agent i knows that agent k is Bayesian rational, it is also common knowledge that if mui(sk j) > 0, then sk j must be optimal for k given some belief over S-k , so (3.i) is common knowledge.

Suppose now that (3.i) is common knowledge. Then, by (3.i), agent i knows that agent k is Bayesian rational. Since (3.i) is common knowledge, all statements of the form `For i, j, . . . , k in N, i knows that j knows that . . . is Bayesian rational' follow by induction. QED

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Copyright © 2002
Peter Vanderschraaf
peterv@cyrus.andrew.cmu.edu

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