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Proof of Proposition 3.11

Proposition 3.11 (Aumann 1987)
If each agent i in N is omega-Bayes rational at each possible world omega in Omega, then the agents are following an Aumann correlated equilibrium. If the CPA is satisfied, then the correlated equilibrium is objective.

Proof.
We must show that s : Omega implies S as defined by the calligraphic-Hi-measurable s i's of the Bayesian rational agents is an objective Aumann correlated equilibrium. Let i in n and omega in Omega be given, and let g i : Omega implies S i be any function that is a function of s i. Since s i is constant over each cell of calligraphic-Hi , g i must be as well, that is, g i is calligraphic-Hi-measurable. By Bayesian rationality,

E ( u i circle s | calligraphic-Hi )( omega ) greater than or equal to E ( u i ( g i , s - i )| calligraphic-Hi )( omega )

Since omega was chosen arbitrarily, we can take iterated expectations to get

E ( E ( u i circle s | calligraphic-Hi )( omega ) ) greater than or equal to E ( E ( u i ( g i , s - i )| calligraphic-Hi )( omega ) )

which implies that

E ( u i circle s ) greater than or equal to E ( u i ( g i , s - i ) )

so s is an Aumann correlated equilibrium.

Copyright © 2001 by
Peter Vanderschraaf
peterv@cyrus.andrew.cmu.edu

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First published: August 27, 2001
Content last modified: August 27, 2001