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EQUILIBRIUM ASSET PRICING WITH TIME-VARYING PESSIMISM

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MOTIVATIONS

- The market equity premium is hard to explain
- Anderson & Hansen & Sargent 1998 introduce robust control as a behavior that may explain the puzzle
- Robustness is pessimism
- Chen & Epstein 2002 give recursive-preference-based foundation to pessimism (Recursive Multiple Priors Utility, RMPU)
- We study prices in a tractable and calibrable RMPU equilibrium

RESULTS

ASSUMPTIONS: The agent has RMPU; Her alternative models have Locally Constrained Entropy (LCE) from the reference model; the opportunity set is stochastic; markets can be incomplete

THEORETICAL RESULTS: LCE-RMPU pessimism can be ⁻xed in realistic amounts; With log utility, equilibrium prices are analytic; Equity premia are a®ected with a ⁻rst-order-in-volatility e®ect; Equity returns are not a®ected

CALIBRATION RESULTS: With log utility and an 11% of pessimism, the unconditional equity premium becomes at least ⁻ve times bigger than its non-pessimistic level

THE ECONOMY

- There are two assets, a riskfree asset with rate r and a risky equity with ex-dividend price P

- Equity is a claim on dividends, e
- The opportunity set is governed by the process $\boldsymbol{\mathsf{X}}$

- The model risk process $f\left(X\right)$ drives agent's distrust about that reference model

- The distrust f (X) depends on the state of the economy

THE REFERENCE MODEL AND THE ALTERNATIVES AROUND IT

- The reference model on the total returns to equity is $\frac{dP + edt}{P} = {}^{\textcircled{R}}_{P} dt + {}^{\cancel{M}}_{P} P {}^{\cancel{M}}_{1 i} {}^{\cancel{M}}_{P} {}^{\cancel{M}}_{P} P {}^{\cancel{M}}_{1 i} {}^{\cancel{M}}_{P} {}^{\binom{M}}_{P} {}^{\cancel{M}}_{P} {}^{\binom{M}}_{P} {}^{\binom{M}}_{$

- The alternatives around the reference model are due to a drift-contaminating vector, $h = \frac{h^X}{h^P}$:

$$E_{t}^{h} \cdot \frac{dP + edt}{P} = {}^{\mathbb{B}}_{P} dt + {}^{3}_{4P} P {}^{3} \cdot {}^{1}_{P} P {}^{3}_{1} \cdot {}^{1}_{2P} h^{P} dt$$

LOCALLY CONSTRAINED ENTROPY (LCE)

(t) Et [d (alternative law) =d (reference law)]

- Time-t Relative Entropy for time t +² = $E_t \frac{1}{(t)} (t + 2) \ln (t + 2)^{2}$
- Given a small time increment ², <u>Relative Entropy for t + ² i</u> Relative Entropy for t = $\frac{1}{2}h^{>}h$

- We impose LCE, that is, a local bound on the the time growth rate of relative entropy,

$$\frac{1}{2}h^{>}h\cdot f^{2}(X):$$

Local means for any t and state of the world

LCE VERSUS OTHER AMBIGUITY SET CHOICES

- LCE expresses genuine misspeci⁻cation risk (all the misspeci⁻cation directions have the same Euclidean distance from the reference belief):

 $h^{>}h^{\frac{1}{2}} \cdot 2' jf(X)j:$

- · · · ignorance (Chen & Epstein 2002) does not (one sets constraints component by component; some misspeci⁻ cation directions have lesser Eucledian distance from the reference model):

$$O = 1$$

 $jhj = @ = h^{X} = A \cdot \cdot :$

LCE-RMPU

- w is the fraction of wealth, W, allocated to equity. The current consumption rate is cW. Agent's value function is

$$J = \max_{c;W} \min_{h} E_t^h [u(cW) dt + exp(i \pm dt) (J + dJ)];$$

subject to
$$\frac{dW}{W} = (1_i \ w) \ r \ dt + w \ \frac{dP + edt}{P}$$

and to $\frac{1}{2}h^{>}h \cdot f^{2}(X);$ with $u(cW) = \frac{(cW)^{\circ}i \ 1}{\circ}; \circ < 1$

LCE{RMPU VALUE FUNCTION

- The value function is J (X; W) =
$$\frac{1}{\pm} \frac{e^{g(°; '; X)} W^{\circ} i 1}{\circ}$$
.

- The function g expresses how the agent's welfare is a[®]ected by the Xdriven stochastic evolution of the opportunity set under the reference model as well as by time variation of her con⁻dence in such model:

$$\frac{@}{@X}g(^{\circ};';X) = g^{\emptyset} \quad ; \quad \frac{@^2}{@X^2}g(^{\circ};';X) = g^{\emptyset\emptyset}$$

- The closed-form Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is

. . . .

$$i \frac{WJ_{WW}}{J_W} = 1i^{\circ}$$
:

MODEL DETECTION AND AMOUNT OF LCE-RMPU PESSIMISM

- The probability of confusing the reference model (h = 0) with the worst case model (h^{x}) is

$$\frac{1}{2} \exp \left[i \right] N \frac{h^{\pi} h^{\pi}}{8} = \frac{1}{2} \exp \left[i \right] N \frac{\eta}{4}; \qquad \frac{1}{2} \exp \left[i \right] 400 \notin \frac{0:015}{4} = 0:11$$

- After 400 quarterly century-long observations, the residual pessimism is associated to ' = 0:015.

OPTIMAL POLICIES UNDER LCE-RMPU

- » is X's instantaneous volatility. The optimal policies are

* (consumption)
$$C^{\alpha} = \frac{3}{\frac{e^{\circ g}}{\pm}} \int_{i}^{1} \frac{1}{i}$$

$$C^{x} = \frac{e^{-s}}{t}$$

* (equity investment) $W^{\alpha} = \frac{\mu_{\alpha}}{1_{i}} \frac{1}{\sigma_{i}} \frac{1}{\frac{2'}{G(W^{\alpha})}} \frac{1}{j} fj$ $\tilde{\mathbf{A}} \qquad \tilde{\mathbf{A}} \qquad \boldsymbol{\mu} \qquad \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{:5} \qquad \boldsymbol{I} \qquad \boldsymbol{I}_{:5} \qquad \boldsymbol{I} \qquad \boldsymbol{I} \qquad \boldsymbol{I}_{:5} \qquad \boldsymbol{I} \qquad \boldsymbol{I}_{:5} \qquad \boldsymbol{I} \qquad \boldsymbol{I} \qquad \boldsymbol{I} \qquad \boldsymbol{I} \qquad \boldsymbol{I}_{:5} \qquad \boldsymbol{I} \qquad \boldsymbol{$ $G(w^{\alpha}) = \frac{3}{4} g^{2} w^{\alpha 2} + \frac{3}{2} g^{0} g^{0} + 2 w^{\alpha} \frac{1}{2} g^{0} g^{0}$

LCE-RMPU: FIRST-ORDER-IN-VOLATILITY EFFECT

- The `hat' symbol denotes equilibrium quantities (market clearing: w=1; $W\,c=e)$

- The log-utility conditional equity premium is

$$\begin{split} \widehat{\boldsymbol{\vartheta}}_{P} \; \boldsymbol{i} \; \boldsymbol{b} \; &= \; \widehat{\boldsymbol{M}}_{P}^{2} \; + \\ & \quad \mathbf{O} & & \quad \mathbf{1}_{:5} \\ & \underbrace{\boldsymbol{\varpi}}_{P}^{2} \; + \; 2 \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \, \widehat{\boldsymbol{M}}_{P} \, \ast \, \widehat{\boldsymbol{g}}^{0} \; + \; (\ast \, \widehat{\boldsymbol{g}}^{0})^{2} \\ & \stackrel{\mathbf{A}}{\mathbf{j}} \; \boldsymbol{f} \; (X) \mathbf{j} \; \underbrace{}^{\mathbf{3}} \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P}^{2} \; + \; \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \, \ast \, \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \, \mathbf{g}^{0} \; \cdot \\ & \stackrel{\mathbf{M}}{\mathbf{j}} \underbrace{}^{2} \; + \; 2 \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \, \underbrace{}^{\mathbf{3}} \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \, \ast \, \underbrace{\boldsymbol{g}}^{0} \; + \; (\ast \, \underbrace{\boldsymbol{g}}^{0})^{2} \\ & \stackrel{\mathbf{M}}{\mathbf{j}} \; \mathbf{f} \; (X) \mathbf{j} \; \underbrace{}^{\mathbf{3}} \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P}^{2} \; + \; \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \, \ast \, \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \, \underbrace{\boldsymbol{g}}^{0} \; \cdot \\ & \stackrel{\mathbf{M}}{\mathbf{j}} \; \underbrace{}^{2} \; \mathbf{j} \; \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \; \mathbf{j} \; \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \; \mathbf{j} \; \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \; \mathbf{j} \; \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}}_{P} \; \underbrace{\boldsymbol{k}$$

A COX-INGERSOLL-ROSS (CIR) EXAMPLE

CIR dynamics for dividend growth volatility and pessimistic maximal distrust function proportional to dividend growth volatility:

$$dX = i \overset{3}{\times} i \overline{X} dt + *(X)^{:5} dZ^{X};$$

$$\frac{de}{e} = \overset{8}{e} dt + \overset{3}{4}_{e} (X)^{:5} \overset{3}{\mu}_{e} dZ^{X} + 1_{i} \overset{2}{\mu}_{e}^{2} dZ^{e};$$


$$f(X) = X = \overline{X}^{:5}:$$


CALIBRATION TO US CONSUMPTION GROWTH DATA

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation
Consumption growth	0.0172	0.0328

 $\Phi X = i 3 \pounds X_i (0:0328)^2 \pounds \Phi t + 0:0783 \pounds X^{:5} \pounds$ news for X; (dividend growth variance)

$$f(X) = X = (0:0328)^{2}$$
:5





CONCLUSIONS

- What does a good story of pessimism say on the historical cost of capital?
- A good story of pessimism is LCE-RMPU because
 - * it is preference-based
 - * it is tractable
 - * it ⁻xes the amount of pessimism
- LCE-RMPU does have impact on equity premia